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EXECUTIVE POWER UNDER THE
NEW ILLINOIS CONSTITUTION:
FIELD REVISITED
by RICHARD E. FAVORITI*
INTRODUCTION

The question of a governor's authority to issue executive
orders that have the force and effect of law is of more than academic interest. On August 20, 1973 Illinois Governor Daniel
Walker issued Executive Order No. 5 pertaining to the disclosure
of political contributions by certain entities.'
The executive order required two types of business entities,
''suppliers" of certain state agencies and "regulated businesses,"
to file statements of political contributions with the Department
of Finance. The order had a retroactive effect in that the initial
disclosure statement was required to reveal certain political contributions made during the preceding twenty-four months. After
this initial filing, individuals or entities that become or continue
to be either a "supplier" or a "regulated business" were required
to file disclosure statements on a semi-annual basis in order to
update their respective lists of contributions.
The disclosure mandated by the order pertained to all contributions to: (1) any candidate for state public office; (2) any
elected official holding state public office; and (3) any organization, committee, fund, party or other entity which gave anything
of value to a candidate for state public office. In addition, not
only were the political contributions of a "supplier" and/or a
"regulated business" required to be disclosed, but Executive
Order No. 5 also required disclosure of political contributions
made by certain defined "key persons."
Opposition to Executive Order No. 5 was immediate. Shortly
after its issuance, a complaint was filed in the Circuit Court of
Cook County, Illinois, Chancery Division, seeking, inter alia, to
restrain the enforcement of this order. On September 21,
1973, after reading the briefs and hearing oral argument, the
court ruled that the scope of Executive Order No. 5 exceeded the
* J.D., Northwestern University School of Law; B.S.C., DePaul University. Associate with the firm of Burditt & Calkins. Chairman of the
Community Education Committee for Young Lawyers' Section of the Chicago
Bar Association.
1 The full text of Executive Order No. 5 is set out in the Appendix

following this article.
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authority of the governor and ordered the issuance of a temporary injunction. Further court action on this matter is anticipated.
This discussion will scrutinize a number of theories upon
which the authority of a governor to issue executive orders is
said to be founded.
THE EXECUTIVE ORDER AS A MANAGERIAL TOOL

It is generally recognized that the power to direct government officials is one of the most potent managerial powers that
a governor may utilize. Although this power has not been clearly
defined, it is generally agreed that a gubernatorial executive order can be an acceptable tool in implementing this power. A lack
of uniformity among the states with respect to their constitutions,
statutes, executive practices and court decisions prohibits treating the subject of executive orders as a uniform, unvarying form
of governmental action. Nevertheless, three general classifications of executive orders may be defined: (1) ceremonial proclamations, (2) gubernatorial enactments, and (3) administrative
orders.
Ceremonial proclamations are the most familiar type of
gubernatorial executive order. This recognition is primarily
attributed to the newsworthiness normally attached to the subject
matters of such orders. Generally, the orders are formal in
nature in that they are frequently issued over the signature of
the governor, characteristically embossed with the seal of the
state and invariably published or pronounced to the community at large. Gubernatorial proclamations establishing spe2
cial observance days are forms of this type of order.
Occasionally, a governor may issue an executive order
which not only affects the community at large, but which also
has the force of law. One possible basis for the issuance of such
an order is a governor's statutory authority to promulgate regulations. An example of this use of executive order authority can
be found within the Illinois Civil Defense Act, which enabled the
governor to make or rescind any rules and regulations necessary
to carry out the provisions of that Act.2
In addition to the use of executive orders for the purpose
of ceremonial proclamations and gubernatorial enactments, the
governor may issue an order affecting the administrative direction and/or control of state activities. Although few governors
possess the untempered power to control all activities within
2 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 6, § 16 (1971)
(Citizenship Day) ; ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 1261/2, § 45.1 (1971) (Gold Star Mothers Day); ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
23, § 3366 (1971) (White Cane Safety Day) ; ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 46, § 22-7

(1971)
3

(announcing election results).
STAT. ch. 127, § 274(c)

ILL. REv.

(1) (1971).
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their states, it is generally recognized that if the authority of a
governor to direct and supervise is to be effective, it is imperative that he possess a certain measure of control over many
areas of state activity. A common use of this type of order
involves the day to day relationships existing between the governor and the officers serving in the executive department. For
example, the governor of Iowa issued an executive order to
"All State Departments" requesting that all state department
automobiles stationed and operated in the Des Moines area be
4
"inspected."
Although the form and style of an executive order is largely
dependent upon the personal judgment of its author, certain factors are usually taken into consideration in drafting an order:
(1) the subject matter of the order, (2) the person to whom
the order is directed, (3) the result sought to be achieved by the
order, (4) the implications to be conveyed regarding the consequences of noncompliance with the order, and (5) the legal
foundation for the issuance of the order.5
An executive order based on these considerations may take
the form of a "request" to subordinate officials. For example,
Governor Romney of Michigan, in issuing a directive concerning departmental reports, employed such mild phraseology
as "it is desired," "each agency head is requested to," and
"please submit a report." The directive concluded by stating
that: "Your cooperation in making this an effective reporting
system will be appreciated very much." 6 In contrast, a departmental communication issued by Governor Romney's predecessor,
Governor Swainson, carried an implication of penalty for noncompliance. Governor Swainson's order "directed" all state
agencies to comply with a list of requirements designed to implement the provisions of the State Civil Defense Act.,
It is arguable that the binding quality of an order and its
implications of penalty for noncompliance are stronger in orders
phrased as a mandate than in orders phrased as a request. The
choice of what language to use is likely to emanate from the
governor's relationship to the recipients of the order, his determination of the importance of the order's subject matter, and
the diligence with which he seeks to achieve the desired results.
Although the factors discussed above are germane to the
4State of Iowa Executive Order No. 5, April 11, 1961.

5 NoTE, GubernatorialExecutive Orders as Devices for Administrative
Direction and Control, 50 IOWA L. REV. 78, 84 (1964).
6 State of Michigan, General Departmental Communication No. 1,
January 16, 1963. See also, State of Michigan, General Departmental
Communication No. 5, September 20, 1962.
State of Michigan, General Departmental Communication No. 2,
February 17, 1961.
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treatment of the subject of executive orders, the most prominent
consideration with respect to the use of this managerial tool is
the legal basis for its issuance.
A governor's power to issue an executive order may find its
genesis in any one of four sources: (1) broad grants of power
emanating from general constitutional provisions; (2) specific
grants of power based upon explicit and defined constitutional
provisions; (3) general grants of power derived from broad
statutory authority; and (4) specific grants of power resulting
from individual legislative enactments.
BROAD GRANTS FROM GENERAL CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

A majority of the fifty state constitutions employ language
which vests the "supreme executive power,"8 the "chief executive
power,"" or the "executive power" 10 in the office of the governor.
Similarly, most of the state constitutions clothe the governor
with the responsibility to "take care that the laws [of the state]
It has been contended that such
are faithfully executed.""
provisions afford the governor general constitutional authority
to issue executive orders. However, a review of the various
jurisdictions construing these provisions discloses a lack of uniformity in determining their effect.
One of the earliest considerations given to the nature and
extent of the powers of the chief executive was the 1839 Illinois
case of Field v. People ex rel. McClernand.2 The central question
in the Field case revolved around the existence of the governor's
power, by virtue of the general language of the state constitution,
to remove the secretary of state from office and appoint a successor at will.
Two arguments were advanced in Field in support of the
governor's power. The first was based upon five sections of the
Illinois Constitution of 1818:
The powers of the government of the state of Illinois shall be
divided into three distinct departments; and each of them be confided to a separate body of magistracy, to wit: Those which are
legislative, to one; those which are executive to another; and those
which are judiciary, to another.'"
No person or collection of persons, being one of those departments, shall exercise any power properly belonging to either of the
1 4
others, except as hereinafter expressly directed or permitted.
8
E.g., ILL. CONST. art V § 8; CAL. CONST. art. V, § 1.
9
E.g., VA. CONST. art. V, § 69.
10E.g., IND. CONST. art. V, § 1.
"E.g., ALA. CONST. art. V, § 120; MINN. CONST. art. V, § 4; CAL.
CONST. art. V, § 7.
123 Ill. (2 Scammon) 79 (1839).
Is ILL. CONST. art. I, § 1 (1818).
14 Id. art. I, § 2.
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The executive power of the state shall be vested in a governor.15
He [the governor] may require information in writing from
the officers in the executive department, upon any subject relating
to the duties of their respective offices, and shall take care that the
laws be faithfully executed. 6
The governor shall nominate and (by and with the advice and
consent of the senate) appoint a secretary of state, who shall keep
a fair register of the official acts of the governor, and when required, shall lay the same and all papers, minutes and vouchers
relative thereto, before either branch of the general assembly,
and shall perform such other duties-as shall be assigned him by
law."
The initial inquiry which the argument demanded was a determination of whether the power claimed by the governor
could be implied from the foregoing provisions of the Constitution of 1818. The court recognized that powers, other than those
expressly granted, may be and often are, conferred by implication, and that under every constitution, the doctrine of implication must be resorted to in order to carry out the general grants
of power.18 The court amplified this general premise by stating
that because of the very nature of the instrument, a constitution
cannot enter into a minute specification of all the minor powers
naturally and obviously included in and flowing from the great
and important powers which are expressly granted.1 9 Moreover,
the court noted that as a general rule, when a constitution grants
a general power or enjoins a duty, it also gives by implication
every particular power necessary for the exercise of the one or
2
the performance of the other. 0
Speaking for the majority of the court, Mr. Justice Wilson
stated that the first two constitutional provisions, article I sections 1 and 2, represented the declaration of a fundamental principle, and that although one of vital importance, it was to be
understood in a limited and qualified sense. He continued by
saying that:
It does not mean that the legislative, executive, and judicial power
should be kept so entirely separate and distinct as to have no connection or dependence, the one upon the other; but its true meaning, both in theory and practice, is, that the whole power of two
or more of these departments shall not be lodged in the same
hands, whether of one or many. That this is the sense in which
this maxim was understood by the authors of our government,
and those of the general and state governments, is evidenced by the
constitutions of all. In every one, there is a theoretical or practical
5

Id. art. III, § 1.
Id. art. III, § 7.
11Id. art. III, § 20.
18 Field v. People ex rel. McClernand, 3 Ill. (2 Scammon) 79, 83 (1839).
19Id.
20 Id.
'

16
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recognition of this maxim, and at the same time a blending and
admixture of different powers. This admixture in practice, so
far as to give each department a constitutional control over the
other, is considered, by the wisest statesmen, as essential in a free
government, as a separation. This clause, then, is the broad
theoretical line of demarcation, between the three great departments of government. But we are not therefore, when a question
arises as to the extent of the powers of either, to confine our views
to this general clause, which confers no specific powers. We should
look to the division as actually made, to see what powers are
clearly granted; for such only can be exercised. As no power,
then, is granted to the governor by these sections, it necessarily
follows that none can be implied.21

With respect to the clause vesting the executive power in
the governor, article III section 1, the court noted that this provision conferred no specific power, and that like the above two
provisions, it represented the declaration of a general rule.
Quoting from a decision rendered by the United States Supreme
Court, the court said, "that the general principles contained in
the constitution, are not to be regarded as rules to fetter and
control, but as matter merely declaratory and directory .. .
The court then considered the remaining two constitutional
provisions, article III sections 7 and 20, and found no legal
foundation upon which the governor's attempted removal of the
23
secretary of state could stand.
The governor's second argument recognized that the power
of removal was an executive function belonging to the governor,
and contended that the power of removal was a necessary incident to the power of appointment. After some discussion, the
court negated both theories and held that the governor had no
2
power to remove the secretary of state at will. 4
Other states have wrestled with the constitutionality of exercising executive power. In Martin v. Chandler,25 the Kentucky
Court of Appeals upheld a complaint challenging gubernatorial
authority to issue an executive order which transferred the funds,
personnel and functions of a division of the Department of Education to the Department of Finance. In entering an order directing the issuance of a permanent injunction, the reviewing
court determined that an alleged specific statutory provision was
inapplicable as a basis for issuing the executive order, in that the
facts did not warrant the use of that statute as authority.
After failing to find any constitutional authority for the issuance
of the executive order in question, the court went on to say that
22
23

Id. at 83-84.
Id. at 84.
Id. at 108-09.

24

Id. at 123.

21

"r 318 S.W.2d (1958).
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the "governor has only such powers as are vested in him by the
Constitution and the statutes enacted pursuant thereto . . .
[b]asically his power is to execute the laws, not to create laws. ''
Courts in other states have taken a position contrary to that
expressed in the Field and Martin cases. These courts have found
that constitutional provisions vesting "the chief executive power
of the state" in the governor and delegating to him the responsibility of "taking care that the laws of the state are faithfully
executed" import general grants of power from which other
powers may be implied. One of the strongest judicial pronouncements supporting this view is the Indiana case of Tucker
27
v. State.

-3

In 1940 a single political party gained control of the Indiana
legislature and every office except that of governor. By means of
legislative enactments, the party in control sought to reorganize
the executive branch in such a way as to severely limit the
governor's power to appoint and in other ways leave him virtually
powerless. After a gubernatorial veto of this legislation had been
overridden, the governor caused the attorney general to initiate
a lawsuit testing the constitutionality of the reorganization acts.
From the entry of an order directing the issuance of a temporary injunction restraining the enforcement of the acts, the
defendants appealed. In affirming the lower court judgment,
the Indiana Supreme Court ruled that the reorganization statutes were unconstitutional and that the executive power vested
28
in the governor carried with it the general power to appoint.
In an attempt to promote what has come to be known as the
"strong governor" concept, dicta continued to rationalize the
court's sweeping action. The defendants argued that if the
provision, "The executive power of the State shall be vested
in a Governor,'2 9 is construed as a grant of all executive power
to the governor, the special grants thereafter itemized were unnecessary surplusage and, therefore, the provision should have
been limited to the powers expressly conferred by specific mention.3 0 The court rejected the argument by stating:
But if the executive powers granted to the governor are confined to expressed grants, the provision that the executive power
shall vest in the governor is surplusage, and this cannot be. An
examination of the provisions referred to as granting express
executive power to the governor discloses that they are not, in fact,
grants of power, but rather directions or mandates as to the
manner in which executive power is to be exercised, or limitations
26 Id. at 44.
218 Ind. 614, 35 N.E.2d 270 (1941).
28M. at 652, 35 N.E.2d at 284.
29 IND. CONST. art. V, § 1.
30 218 Ind. 614, 654, 35 N.E.2d 270, 285 (1941).
27
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upon3 power or delegation of power which is not in essence executive. '
It is apparent from the foregoing discussion that the inexact
language of a constitution purporting to define executive power
may permit either a limited construction, such as that given in
the Field decision, or a broad construction, such as that given in
the Tucker case. This kind of pliable phraseology appears in
the Illinois Constitution of 1970 and may afford Illinois courts
an opportunity to modify Field, though it would require a significant alteration if not an overruling of Field, to do so.
Article II of section 1 of the new constitution provides, "The
legislative, executive and judicial branches are separate. No
branch shall exercise powers properly belonging to another."
In addition, article V section 8 further provides that "The Governor shall have the supreme executive power, and shall be re'3 2
sponsible for the faithful execution of the laws."
It is doubtful that the governor could successfully contend
that his power to issue Executive Order No. 5 is implied from
the express terms of article II section 1. Basically, this section
does not expressly grant any powers, but rather reiterates the
separation of powers doctrine which is fundamental to our system of government. Furthermore, it was the intent of the
drafters of the new constitution to leave this provision unchanged
during the course of constitutional revision. In presenting the
separation of powers article to the convention, Delegate Davis
commented as follows:
We do not intend in any way to change the purport of the article.
We recognize that probably there is no read [sic] need to have an
article on the separation or distribution of powers. However, this
is such an essential and traditional part of our form of government, and it is a part of nearly every constitution of this country.
We therefore felt that it would be appropriate - and as a traditionalist I feel it is almost essential - to have an expression of
the basic principle upon which our government works.33
Nor should the governor be permitted to imply the necessary power to issue Executive Order No. 5 from the provisions
of article V section 8. Arguably, the terms of this provision are
merely declaratory in nature and serve to grant no express powers. The 1839 decision rendered by the Illinois Supreme Court in
the Field case demonstrates a narrow construction of executive
power. Although the issue of executive orders and the power of
a governor to issue them is in dispute throughout the states, the
Illinois Supreme Court has not chosen to restrict or abandon the
81 Id. at 656-57, 35 N.E.2d at 286.

"2ILL. CONST. art. V,

§ 8 (emphasis added).

OF PROC., SIXTH ILL. CONST. CONV., Verbatim Transcripts,
[hereinafter cited as Verbatim Transcripts].
Vol. II at 1067 (1969-70).
33REC.
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reasoning behind the Field decision. Thus, the point that the
doctrine of implication cannot be used unless there is a grant of
an express power is still valid in Illinois today. Therefore, by
virtue of the Field opinion, the governor should not be permitted
to imply from the imprecise language of article V section 8 the
power to issue an order as far reaching as Executive Order No. 5.
Article II section 2 of the 1970 Illinois Constitution is a new
provision which states, "The enumeration in this Constitution of
specified powers and functions shall not be construed as a limiThe Constitutional
tation of powers of state government."
Commentary to the annotated statutes indicates that:
Section 2 was probably intended, in part, to supersede the case of
Field v. People ex rel. McClernand, 3 Ill. 79 (1839), which held
that a constitution is a limitation on the power of the legislative
branch of government, but a grant of powers (with the attendant
problems of strict construction) to the executive and judicial
branches34
However, it would appear that this provision does not limit or
supersede that part of the Field decision pertaining to general
declaratory sections of the Illinois Constitution and the inability
to imply powers therefrom. Article V section 8 generally declares that "The Governor shall have the supreme executive
power, and shall be responsible for the faithful execution of the
laws." The application of article II section 2, by its own language, is limited to the "enumeration . . . of specified powers
and functions." It would be difficult to contend that article V
section 8 "enumerates" any "specified powers" or "specific functions." If the terms of article II section 2 leave the language
of article V section 8 unaffected, then the position adopted in the
Field decision - that if no power is granted to the governor,
none can be implied - also remains unchanged.
Another executive order issued by Governor Walker, Executive Order No. 4 dealing with financial disclosure requirements
for employees under the governor's jurisdiction, has also been
challenged in the courts. In a recent trial court decision 5 the
court placed principal reliance upon article XIII section 236 of
the 1970 Constitution in upholding the governor's power to
impose such disclosure requirements. By way of dicta, how34 R. Helman & W. Whalen, Constitutional Commentary, 48, S.H.A.,
art. II, § 2.
3- The decision was rendered in an opinion letter filed by Judge Ackerman of the Seventh Judicial Circuit in an action consolidating three cases:
Illinois State Employees Ass'n v. Walker, No. 365-73; Illinois Ass'n of
Highway Engineers v. Walker, No. 366-73; and Troopers Lodge # 41,
Fraternal Order of Police v. Walker, No. 379-73. The plaintiffs sought a
declaration that Executive Order No. 4, issued by Governor Walker on
February 26, 1973, was illegal, unconstitutional, and unenforceable against
plaintiffs and persons similarly situated in state government.
36 See page 244 infra.
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ever, the court indicated that the governor's principal power is
derived from the general language of article V section 8. The
court found that the latter part of that provision clearly required the governor to insure that state employees under his
control were properly performing the duties assigned to them.
It is certain that the decision will be appealed, but it is not
known what attention, if any, the Illinois Appellate Court
will devote to article V section 8. The appeal will present
an opportunity for the appellate court to modify the Field
opinion by declaring that article V section 8 is a grant of express
power and not just a general declaratory provision. If such a
result is brought about, further credence will be added to the
implied ability of the governor to issue an executive order. But
that ability arguably should be restricted to only those departments and persons uniter the direction and control of the chief
executive.
SPECIFIC GRANTS FROM EXPLICIT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

Although specific constitutional provisions upon which gubernatorial executive orders can be based are somewhat rare,
the Illinois Constitution ofo1970 contains two provisions which
arguably may include specific powers from which other powers
might be implied. Article V section 11 is new and authorizes the
governor, by executive order, to reassign functions and to organize executive agencies which are directly responsible to him. If
the executive order contravenes a statute, the General Assembly
still has the power, by a majority of either house, to disapprove
the executive order. Although this section is of no apparent significance to the problem at hand, the committee report on this
matter to the Constitutional Convention of 1970 is noteworthy.
The comments of Executive Article Committee Chairman Tecson
indicate an intent to limit the governor's power in this regard
to those persons who are directly responsible to him:
It's a device which is new to the state of Illinois. It's present in
other states in their constitutions, and the purpose of this section
is to give authority to the governor to reorganize agencies which
are directly responsible to him. It in no way touches upon or
impinges upon the authority of other elected officers. It in no way
touches upon or impinges upon quasi-judicial or quasi-legislative
boards - for example, the Commerce Commission, or the Industrial Commission. It is designed mostly to assist the governor in
his duty as chief executive, to help realign functions, mostly in his
Code Departments. It is not intended to create any authority or
to remove any authority. 37
Chairman Tecson's remarks also should be kept in mind
when considering the novel quality of article XIII section 2:
31 Verbatim Transcripts, vol. III at 1327.
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All candidates for or holders of state offices and all members of a
Commission or Board created by this Constitution shall file a
verified statement of their economic interests, as provided by law.
The General Assembly by law may impose a similar requirement
upon candidates for, or holders of, offices in units of local government and school districts. Statements shall be filed annually
with the Secretary of State and shall be available for inspection
by the public. The General Assembly by law shall prescribe a
reasonable time for filing the statement. Failure to file a statement within the time prescribed shall result in ineligibility for,
or forfeiture of, office. This Section shall not be construed as
limiting the authority of any branch of government to establish
8
and enforce ethical standards for that branch.
It can be contended that this section of the constitution not only
endorses the disclosure of economic interests, but also encourages
those in positions of governmental responsibility to take action
in the field of ethics. In view of the specific indication that "any
branch" shall not be limited in its enforcement of ethical standards, it is clear that the executive branch falls within this grant.
However, the proceedings of the 1970 Constitutional Convention
further support the conclusion that, with respect to the governor,
the implied power derived from this provision is restricted to
those persons and agencies which come within the control and
rule of the governor:
[I] think that we have to depend on the governor to set up his own
methods of control of his directors, who are under his immediate
supervision.
The elected officers . . . are only under the supervision of
the people. The governor can't enforce a standard of conduct with
them. In his own directed departments he's got the responsibility
and duty of doing it."9
It therefore appears that while the framers of the 1970 Constitution responded to the need for an ethics section by drafting
an explicit constitutional provision, this grant of power was not
without limitation.
The limitation contemplated by the drafters finds further
support in the traditional separation of powers doctrine. Each of
the prior constitutions under which Illinois has been governed has
contained an express provision dividing and distributing the
powers of government and prohibiting one department from exercising the powers belonging to another."' The 1970 Illinois
Constitution is no exception. 4 1 The purpose behind such a provision is founded upon the scheme of checks and balances designed to keep each department within its own sphere.

XIII, §

In actu-

38

ILL. CONST. art.

39

Verbatim Transcripts, vol. III at 1753 (remarks of Delegate Can-

field).

2.

40 ILL. CONST. art. I, §§ 1, 2 (1818) ; ILL. CONST. art. II, §§ 1, 2 (1848);
ILL. CONST. art. III (1870).
41 ILL. CONST. art. II, § 1.

246

The John Marshall Journal of Practice and Procedure

[Vol. 6:235

ality the separation of powers doctrine does not operate with the
precision of the theory; for the three coordinate branches of the
government are not completely independent of each other.
Accomplishing the legitimate purposes of government often
requires that the three branches act in concert, and it is not
uncommon for one branch to permit powers, which in strict legal
theory fall within its own realm, to be exercised by a coordinate
branch. However, when a case does arise involving an alleged
appropriationof power, a literal interpretation of the separation
2
of powers provision is more readily justified.4
Thus, if Executive Order No. 5 is to be justified by the
specific constitutional grant of power contained in the ethics
section of the new constitution, it must not transgress the limitations intended by the framers nor the restrictions imposed by
the separation of powers provision. To determine whether or
not Executive Order No. 5 is such a transgression, the scope of
the order must be examined.
The executive order imposes disclosure requirements on
"suppliers" entering into purchase transactions with a "State
Agency." In his order the governor defines "State Agency" as:
any executive department, commission, board or agency whose
vouchers are subject to approval by the department of Finance;
any board, commission, agency or authority which has a majority
of its 43members appointed by the Governor; and the Governor's
Office.
From this definition it is arguable that the order pertains not
only to any executive department, but also to any commission,
board or agency of the legislative or judicial departments whose
vouchers are subject to approval by the Department of Finance.
The vouchers of many governmental agencies, such as those of the
Legislative Reference Bureau, must be processed and approved
by the Department of Finance. In accordance with the definition contained in the executive order, the Legislative Reference
Bureau would be considered a "State Agency" and would be
included within the terms of the order. But it is uncontested that
the Bureau is the purest of legislative agencies and therefore
cannot fall within the executive department's sphere of control.
Hence, by extending his power to the legislative branch, it appears that the governor has overreached whatever implied power
the framers of the constitution intended that he receive by virtue of the ethics section of the new constitution, article XIII
section 2. To the degree that Executive Order No. 5 attempts
to address itself to the departments, boards, commissions and
42 See People ex rel. Elliot v. Covelli, 415 Ill. 79, 112 N.E.2d 156 (1953)
Agran v. Checker Taxi Co., 412 Ill. 145, 105 N.E.2d 713 (1952).
43See appendix.
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agencies of either the legislative or judicial branches of government, it is invalid.
GENERAL GRANTS FROM BROAD STATUTORY AUTHORITY

There are a number of states whose legislatures have enacted statutes granting powers to their governor 4 4 separate
and apart from those powers delegated to him by virtue of their

respective state constitutions. However, it does not appear that
there is much general statutory basis which permits the promulgation of gubernatorial executive orders in the state of Illinois.
Examples of what little statutory power there is can be found in
the Emergency Powers of the Governor- and in the Militia Pow-

ers. 46 The only statutory provision that dealt with the question
of disclosure and at all approached the problem at hand was a
statement pertaining to the promulgation of codes of conduct

under the Ethics Act:
The Governor and each elected State officer in the Executive Department shall promulgate detailed codes of conduct for appointed
officers and employees under their respective jurisdictions.47

4
However, this provision was repealed one year ago.

The absence of broad statutory authority granting general
powers to the governor of Illinois was commented upon by Judge
4
Ackerman in his decision upholding Executive Order No. 4. 9

The opinion indicates that in some areas it is possible that this
lack of statutory authority is a further reflection of the inherent
power implicit within the constitutional provisions pertaining
to the governor. Thus, in Illinois there exist few general grants

of gubernatorial power from broad statutory authority.
44 For example, Iowa's Budget and Financial Control Act states:
The governor of the state shall have:
1. Direct and effective financial supervision over all departments and
establishments, and every state agency by whatever name now or hereinafter called, including the same power and supervision over such private corporations, persons and organizations that may receive, pursuant
to statute, any funds, either appropriated by, or collected for, the state,
or any of its departments, boards, commissions, institutions, divisions
and agencies.
2. The efficient and economical administration of all departments and
establishments of the government.
IOWA CODE ANN. § 8.3 (1), (2) (1967).
A state legislature may further underscore the general constitutional
powers of the governor by using broad statutory language to describe his
authority. For example, the Maryland Code provides:
The head of the Executive Department shall be the Governor of the
State, who in addition to the rights, powers, duties, obligations, and
functions now or hereafter conferred by law, shall also have supervision
and direction over the officers and agencies hereby or hereafter assigned to the Executive Department.
ANN. CODE OF MD. art XLI, § 15 (1957).
45

ILL. REV.
ILL. REv.

STAT.

ch. 123, § 7 (1971).

ch. 129, § 220.03 (1971).
41 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 127, § 605-101 (1971).
48 P.A. 77-1806, art. 8, § 2, effective Jan. 24, 1972.
4
See note 35 supra and accompanying text.
46

STAT.
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SPECIFIC GRANTS FROM INDIVIDUAL LEGISLATIVE ENACTMENTS

Specific statutory provisions which authorize the issuance
of gubernatorial executive orders are not common. However,
it is generally recognized that the chief executive of the state
could be given the power to issue orders for specific purposes,
just as some powers may be specifically delegated to any public
official. A review of the Illinois statutes in this regard reveals
no enactment which specifically directs itself to the granting of
executive order power to the governor. The only statutory provision indicating the possibility of executive order power within
the gubernatorial office is one which provides a procedure
for the numbering of executive orders issued by the governor
and filing with the secretary of state.r °
Thus, the obvious absence of either general or specific statutory authority for the issuance of gubernatorial executive orders
evidences the legislature's reluctance to grant this type of power
to the chief executive.
CONCLUSION

Of the three general classifications of executive orders, it
is clear that Executive Order No. 5 is a gubernatorial enactment,
i.e., one which affects the public at large, intended to have the
force of law and serving to implement or supplement the constitution and laws of Illinois. Any gubernatorial justification for
the issuance of Executive Order No. 5 must find its genesis in
one of the four traditional legal bases discussed in this article.
If the order is to find sustenance in broad grants of power
from general constitutional provisions, it must circumvent the
barrier erected by the Field case. Since the Illinois Supreme
Court has neither restricted nor abandoned the reasoning of
Field, the language of article V section 8 should be considered
general and declaratory from which no other powers may be
implied. However, it is possible that the appeal of Judge Ackerman's recent decision will provide the Illinois Appellate Court
with an opportunity to reconsider the Field case and declare
article V section 8 of the new constitution to be a specification
of powers from which other powers may be implied.
If Executive Order No. 5 lays claim to the ethics section
of the new charter as a specific grant of constitutional power, it
will meet resistance from the framers' expressed intention and
the separation of powers provision. In order for article XIII
section 2 to sanction the issuance of an executive order, the order
must, by virtue of the separation of powers doctrine and the
50 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 124, § 6a (1971).
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manifest intent of the framers of the constitution, be limited in
scope to only those agencies and personnel falling within the
executive department. To the degree that any order attempts
to address itself to the departments, boards, commissions and
agencies of either the legislative or judicial branches of government, it is invalid. Nor will the order find support in general
or specific statutory authority, for there is no such authority
in this regard.
The issuance of Executive Order No. 5 has rekindled the
controversy surrounding the exercise of power by the chief
executive. The Illinois Constitution of 1970, especially the ethics
section of article XIII, is likely to add fuel to the fire. The Field
decision has confined the exercise of executive power for over a
hundred years. Contemporary judicial action may continue to
temper the flame ignited by this latest gubernatorial pronouncement.
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APPENDIX
EXECUTIVE ORDER

No. 5

Disclosure of PoliticalContributions
For too long the relationship between political contributions
and state business has been shrouded in secrecy. The public is
entitled to the assurance that the state's decisions to buy or
build are made on the proper basis of price, service and quality;
that decisions in regard to regulated businesses are based on the
public interest.
Suppliers to the state and businesses regulated by the state,
together with their key officials, should not be precluded from
participating in the political process through any proper means,
including political contributions where the law so permits. But,
it is time to make this financial participation a matter of public
record. The certainty of public exposure will deter the making of
contributions for improper purposes and assure people that government decisions are not made on the basis of political favoritism.
In today's climate, extraordinary steps are required to restore public confidence in government. It is appropriate that
the powers of the Executive be used to the fullest extent possible
to achieve this goal.
Accordingly, I hereby order:
1. For purposes of this Order:
A. "State Agency" means any executive department,
commission, board or agency whose vouchers are
subject to approval by the Department of Finance;
any board, commission, agency or authority which
has a majority of its members appointed by the
Governor; and the Governor's Office.
B. "Purchase Transaction" means a purchase, or a
contract to purchase, goods or services of any kind
by a State agency.
C. "Supplier" means any individual, firm, corporation,
association, partnership, joint venture, sole proprietor or other business entity which is prequalifled to enter, or which enters into, a "purchase
transaction" with a State agency.
D. "Regulated Business" means any individual, firm,
corporation, association, partnership, joint venture,
sole proprietor or other business entity regulated or
licensed, or applying to be regulated or licensed, by
the Department of Insurance, the Department of
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Financial Institutions, the Department of Mines and
Minerals (excepting individuals or business entities
regulated only under Chapter 93, Sections 143-156
(which relates to explosives) and
Chapter 104,
Section 63.1 (which relates to water wells)), the
Commissioner of Banks and Trust Companies, the
Commissioner of Savings and Loan Associations,
the Illinois Liquor Control Commission, the Illinois
Racing Board or the Illinois Commerce Commission.
E.

F.

"Key Person" means (i) any officer, director, partner, proprietor, managing agent or owner (legal or
beneficial) of more than 71/2 percent of any supplier
or regulated business, (ii) any lobbyist representing
such supplier or regulated business who is required
to register under the Lobbyist Registration Act; and
(iii) any other person or entity acting at the direction of any person referred to in subparagraph 1
(E) (i) - (ii).

"Political Contribution" means any gifts of money,
stocks, bonds, goods, property, commercial services
or anything else of value to
i) any candidate for State public office;
ii) any elected official holding State public office;
iii) any organization, committee, fund, party or
other entity giving money, stocks, bonds,
goods, property, commercial services or anything of value to or on behalf of any candidate for State public office.
G. "State Public Office" means all the legislative and
executive offices established under Articles IV and V
of the Illinois Constitution.
.2. Each individual or business entity which is or becomes a
supplier or regulated business prior to September 15,
1973, shall, on or before September 15, 1973, file with
the Department of Finance a Statement of Political Contributions and thereafter shall file such Statement as
required by rules issued by the Department of Finance
pursuant to this Order, but no less often than semi-annually. Each individual or business entity which becomes a supplier or regulated business on or after September 15, 1973, shall file a Statement of Political
Contributions at, or immediately prior to, the time such
individual or business entity becomes a supplier or
regulated business and thereafter shall file such Statement as required by rules issued by the Department
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of Finance pursuant to this Order, but no less often
than semi-annually. No supplier shall be eligible to
enter into a purchase transaction unless such Statement
has been filed in accord with this Order and the rules
issued by the Department of Finance pursuant thereto.
The Statement of Political Contributions shall be under
oath and shall include the date, amount, donor, donee,
and nature of every political contribution and the date,
amount, lender, borrower, terms and extent of repayment of any loan (other than one made by a lending
institution) to any individual or entity referred to in
subparagraph 1 (F) (i) (iii) of this Order made
within the 24-month period prior to the date of filing
of the Statement (i) by the supplier or regulated business directly or through any trade or industry association and (ii) by any key person of that supplier or
regulated business; provided, however, that any Statement required to be filed on or before September 15,
1973, shall set forth the required information for the
24-month period prior to the effective date of this Order
and for the period from the date of this Order through
the date of filing.
The Department of Finance shall, from time to time, as
may be necessary and appropriate, issue rules to implement and enforce this Order.
Each Statement of Political Contributions filed under
this Order shall be open to reasonable public inspection
in accord with rules issued by Department of Finance
pursuant hereto as to the time, place and manner of
inspection.
This Order is effective upon filing with the Secretary of
State and shall remain in full force and effect unless
amended or revoked by Executive action.

